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ABSTRACT
To incentivize users’ participations and steer their online activities,
online social networks start to provide users with various kinds of
rewards for their contributions to the sites. The most frequently dis-
tributed rewards include account levels, reputation scores, different
kinds of badges, and even material awards like small gifts and cash
back, etc. Attracted by these rewards, users will spend more time
using the network services. In this paper, we will mainly focus on
“badges reward systems” but the proposed models can be applied
to other reward systems as well.
Badges are small icons attached to users’ homepages and pro-
files denoting their achievements. People like to accumulate badge
for various reasons and different badges can have specific values
for them. Meanwhile, to get badges, they also need to exert ef-
forts to finish the required tasks, which can lead to certain costs.
To understand and model users’ motivations in badge achievement
activities, we will study an existing badge system launched inside
a real-world online social network, Foursquare, in this paper.
At the same time, to maximize users’ contributions to online
social networks, social network system designers need to deter-
mine the optimal badge system mechanism carefully. Badge sys-
tem mechanism describes various detailed aspects of the system
and can involve many parameters, e.g., categories of existing badges,
number of badges available as well as the minimum contributions
required to obtain the badges, which all need to be designed with
meticulous investigations. Based on the model of users’ badges
accumulating activities, in this paper, we will also study how to
design the badge system that can incentivize the maximum users’
contributions to the social networks.
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Figure 1: Statistical information: (a) #shared badges between
pairs in a randomly sampled pair set; (b) fraction of badges
obtained at a certain friend ratio.
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Figure 2: Power law distribution of user fraction and number
of achieved badges.
Social networks, e.g., Facebook, Twitter and Foursquare, have
achieved remarkable success in recent years. These social networks
are mostly driven by user-generated content, e.g., posts, photos and
location checkins. To incentivize users’ participations and steer
their online activities, many social networks start to offer users var-
ious rewards for their contributions to the networks. In this paper,
we will mainly focus on “badge reward systems” but the proposed
models can be applied to other reward systems as well. Badge sys-
tems have been adopted by a wide range of social networks: (1)
Foursquare1, a famous location-based social network (LBSN), is
distributing different badges to users for their geo-location check-
ins; (2) Weibo2, a social media in China, launches a badge system
to give users badges for writing posts and replies; (3) Stack Over-
1https://foursquare.com
2http://www.weibo.com
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Table 1: Properties of the Badge System Dataset
property number
nodes user 4,240badge 1,431
links
follow 81,291
achieved 176,301
level 47,342
flow3, a popular question and answer (Q&A) site for computer pro-
gramming, adopts a system where users can get badges by answer-
ing questions in the site; and (4) In Khan Academy4, a popular mas-
sive open online course (MOOC) site, users are awarded badges for
watching course videos and answering questions.
1.1 User Activity Observations
People like to accumulate badges for various reasons and dif-
ferent badges can have specific values for them. Extensive anal-
yses have been done on a real-world badge system launched in
Foursquare. The badge system dataset was crawled from Foursquare
during the April of 2014. We collected 4, 240 users together with
all the 1, 430 categories of badges achieved by them. These users
are crawled with BFS search from several random seed users via
the social connections in Foursquare, who are connected by follow
links of number 81, 291. To denote that a user has achieved certain
badges, we add achieve links between users and badges, whose to-
tal number is 176, 301 in the crawled dataset. On average, each
user has achieved 42 badges in Foursquare. In addition, each cat-
egory of badges can involve different badge levels, where badges
of consequential levels can be connected by the level links. For ex-
ample, badges of higher level, e.g., l (l > 1), can have level links
pointing to badge of level l−1 and the number of level links among
badges is 47, 342. A more detailed information about the dataset is
available in Table 1.
The statistical analyses results about the badge system dataset
are available in Figure 1 and Table 2, from which many interesting
phenomena can be observed:
1. Generally, users who are friends are more likely to share
common badges. We randomly sample a certain number of
user pairs who are (1) friends (i.e., connected by social links)
and (2) not friends from Foursquare, and count the number of
common badges shared by these user pairs respectively. The
results are given in Figure 1(a), where the x axis is the num-
ber of randomly sampled user pairs and the y axis denotes the
number of shared badges between these sampled pairs. From
Figure 1(a), we can observe that online badge achievement in
social networks is correlated with social connections among
users and friends are more likely to have common badges.
2. In many cases, users are likely to obtain badges which have
never been achieved by his friends. As shown in Figure 1(b),
for each badge bj , obtained by user ui, we get the timestamp
when ui get bj and the ratio of ui’s friends who obtain bj
before ui. The distribution of the percentage of badges ob-
tained at different ratios is given in Figure 1(b), from which
we can observe that a large proportion of badges are obtained
at small ratios, i.e., few of ui’s friends have achieved the
badge before ui.
3http://stackoverflow.com
4https://www.khanacademy.org
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Figure 3: Top 10 badges achieved by most users
Figure 4: Tasks needed to unlock “JetSetter” badges.
3. In some cases, users will follow their friends when most of
their peers have obtained a certain badge. Still in Figure 1(b),
when the ratio is close to 1.0, i.e., almost all the peers have
obtained a certain badge, the fraction of badge obtained will
increase to 0.1, representing that about 10% of the badges
are obtained by users when all his friends have achieved the
badge. As a result, users’ badge achievement activities in on-
line social networks are highly related to those of their peers.
These three observed effects of peers’ badges on users’ ac-
tivities are called the peer leadership value of badges in Sec-
tion 3.1.
4. Users are keen on getting badges that are to their interests.
In Table 2, we extract top 10 popular badges achieved by the
most users in Foursquare and each of these badges has 10
different levels. Numbers of users who have obtained certain
levels of each kind of badge as well as the total number of
badges achieved (i.e., summation of each row of the table)
are provided. The corresponding icons of these badges are
shown in Figure 3. Generally, higher-level badges require
more efforts from the users, but from Table 2, we observe
there are still a large number of users are willing to devote
such high efforts to get the badges due to their personal in-
terests. For example, among the 2, 468 users who achieved
the “Fresh Brew” badge of level 1, 22.5% of them will con-
tinue to get badge of level 5, which may denote these users
like drinking coffee a lot. Similarly, for users who get differ-
ent levels of “Mall Rat” badges, they should like shopping a
lot; users who get the “JetSetter” badges are those who travel
frequently. As a result, badges can reveal users personal in-
terests, especially higher-level badges. Such a kind of effects
Table 2: Number of users achieving top 10 badges
badge obtain it by # users achieving badges of different levels total
name checking-in at 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 number
Fresh Brew Coffee Shops 2468 1914 1235 817 555 374 255 144 78 38 7878
Mall Rat Shopping Malls 2545 1907 1076 624 366 224 130 81 46 29 7028
JetSetter Airport Terminals 2357 1703 972 564 339 210 147 102 63 11 6468
Hot Tamale Mexican Restaurants 2305 1733 989 583 336 191 105 58 37 18 6355
Great Outdoors Parks and Outdoors 2119 1535 801 468 295 200 132 95 53 30 5728
Pizzaiolo Pizza Restaurants 2192 1450 605 267 116 62 26 16 8 4 4746
Swimmies Lake/Pond/Beach 1888 1214 538 281 159 107 74 47 36 17 4361
Bento Sushi Restaurants 1741 1121 459 209 104 63 34 21 14 8 3774
Zoetrope Movie Theaters 1985 1106 309 103 34 16 12 6 5 4 3580
Flame Broiled Burger Restaurants 1944 1044 337 105 40 13 6 3 1 1 3494
of badges for users is defined as the personal interest value
of badges in Section 3.3.
5. Users in online social networks are enthusiastic in earning
badges. As shown in Figure 2, the distribution of user frac-
tions obtaining a certain number badges follows the power
law [5] and the majority of the users in Foursquare have
obtained more than 50 badges in Foursquare. In Table 2,
we observe that over 2, 000 have ever obtained the “Fresh
Brew”, “Mall Rat”, “JetSetter”, “Hot Tamale”, “Great Out-
doors” and “Pizzaiolo” badges. Considering that there are
only 4, 240 users in the dataset, we can observe that most
users in Foursquare have achieved these badges. One poten-
tial explanation of the observation can be that: initially, peo-
ple use social network services independently of the badges;
meanwhile, after using the network for a while, users start
to lose interesting, and the badges start to play their roles
in keeping users within the network. Such a kind of effects
of badges on users is defined as the network trend value of
badges in Section 3.2.
1.2 Badge System Analysis
To get badges, users in online social networks are required to
finish certain tasks, which can be (1) finishing a certain number of
checkins at required locations in Foursquare, (2) answering a num-
ber of questions proposed by other users in Stack Overflow, and
(3) publishing required numbers of posts in Weibo. These tasks
of higher-level badges are usually more challenging. For instance,
as shown in Figure 4, by checking at 20 different airports, users
can get the “JetSetter” badges from level 1 to level 5. However, to
unlock the “JetSetter” badge of level 6, users need to check in at an-
other 5 new airports. Obviously, these tasks can yield some costs,
which can be time, money or knowledge spent on the tasks. The
payoff of achieving certain badges is defined as “(value - cost)”,
i.e., the utility of badges for users. Besides the above badge val-
ues, users can also get other benefits from the network, e.g., enjoy
the social network services. With the same model to be proposed
in this paper, such benefits can be handled by either incorporat-
ing them into the above corresponding badge value categories or
introducing a new value category. Since we mainly focus on the
badges system design problem in this paper, we will only consider
the above badge values to simplify the problem settings. When the
value of badges can exceed the cost, users may try to get the badge;
otherwise, they will not devote their efforts as they can get no pay-
offs from these badges. Costs of obtaining badges are fixed but the
value of badges can be influenced by other users’ badge achieve-
ment activities. Each user in online social network is assumed to
be “selfish” and wants to maximize his payoff (i.e., the utility) and
the badge achieving activities will form a game with other users in
the network.
Meanwhile, badges in online social networks are used to incen-
tivize users’ contributions to the sites. To achieve such a goal, the
system designer needs to determine the optimal settings for a badge
system, which is formally defined as the badge system mechanism
in this paper. Badge system mechanism covers every aspect of the
system and contains many parameters, which include:
• Categories of Badges: A badge is said to be contributing if
it can attract lots of users’ contributions to the social net-
work. We will study the contributions attracted by different
categories of badges from users and find the most contribut-
ing ones in online social networks. This problem is helpful
for badge designer to determine which categories of badges
should be placed in social networks.
• Number of Badges: The number of badges to be placed in on-
line social networks is very important for an effective badge
system. If a large number of badges are placed in social net-
works, users can always get badges to their interests or have
never be obtained by others before very easily, which will
make the system fail to work in steering users’ online activi-
ties.
• Badge Threshold: Setting the badge contribution threshold
(i.e., the minimum required contribution to get the badge) is
very tricky. If the threshold is set too low, most users will
get the badge easily with little efforts and the total amount
of contributions drawn by these badges will be low. On the
other hand, if the threshold is set too high, very few people
will devote their effort to getting the badge as these badges
are difficult to obtain and the total amount of users’ contri-
butions will be low as well.
1.3 Badge System Modeling Challenges
The badge system analysis and design problem studied in this
paper is a new research problem and it is very challenging to solve
due to the following reasons:
• Badge Value Definition: The value of badges for users in
online social networks is unclear. Formal definition, quan-
tification and inference of the badge values for users can be
the prerequisite for a comprehensive modeling users’ badge
achievement activities.
• User Utility Function: Users can get reward from the achieved
badges, i.e., the value of badges, but also needs devote their
efforts, i.e., the cost. Formal definition of the payoff by
achieving badges, i.e., the utility, is still an open problem.
• Game Among Users: Each user aims at maximizing his over-
all utility, which can be influenced by other users’ activities
at the same time. As a result, users’ online badge achieving
activities can lead to a game involving all users. Formulation
and analysis of such a game among users in online social
networks is very difficult.
• Optimal Badge Mechanism: Users’ utility in badge achieve-
ment is determined by the badge system mechanism set by
the designer. Users aim at maximizing their overall utility
with as few efforts as possible, while the designer aims at
maximizing users’ overall contribution to the network. As
a result, there also exists a game between users and the de-
signer, which will make the problem more challenging.
The following parts of this paper are organized as follows. Sec-
tion 2 is about the definitions of many important concepts. Various
value functions of badges for users will be introduced and com-
bined in the comprehensive value function in Section 3. Users’
utility function is given in Section 4. In Section 5, we study the
game among users in online social network. In Section 6, we solve
the badge system design problem by formulating it as a game be-
tween users and the designer and provide basic simulation analysis
about various aspects in the badge system design problem. The re-
lated works are introduced in Section 7. Finally, we conclude the
paper in Section 8.
2. TERMINOLOGY DEFINITION
Users in social networks can be gifted in different areas and they
can finish the tasks required to get badges corresponding to their
gifts effortlessly. For instance, in Foursquare, sports enthusiasts
can get Gym Rat badges easily as they do sports in gyms regularly,
while travel lovers can obtain JetSetter or Trainspotter badges by
checking in at train stations and airports frequently. However, for
users who want to get badges of areas that they are not good at,
it would be very difficult to finish the required tasks. For exam-
ple, a sports enthusiast may need to spend lots of time and money
to get the JetSetter or Trainspotter badges by travelling. Simi-
larly, gourmets who seldom do sports may suffer a lot to get Gym
Rat badges by visiting gyms. Let U = {u1, u2, · · · , un} and
B = {b1, b2, · · · , bm} be the sets containing n users andm badges
respectively in the network. To depict such phenomena, we for-
mally define the concepts of ability, effort and contribution of users
in U as well as contribution threshold of badges in B as follows.
Definition 1. (Ability): User ui’s talents or advantages in fields
corresponding to badges in B can be represented as the ability vec-
tor ai = [ai,1, ai,2, · · · , ai,m], where ai,j ≥ 0 denotes ui’s ability
in the field of badge bj or simply ui’s ability to get badge bj .
All people are assumed to be created equally talented. People
can be talented at different aspects but the total intelligence each
people have can be quite close. For simplicity, we assume the
total abilities of different users are equal, i.e., |ai|1 = |aj |1, for∀ui, uj ∈ U . Besides talents, to make achievements in certain ar-
eas, every people need to devote their efforts and passion, which
can be either money, time, energy or knowledge. In this paper, the
resources users will devote to the system is time and the formal
definition of unit time effort is available as follows.
Definition 2. (Unit Time Effort): Vector ei = [ei,1, ei,2, · · · , ei,m]
denotes user ui’s efforts devoted to the field corresponding badges
in B in unit time, where ei,j ≥ 0 represents ui’s effort devoted in
the area of badge bj , or simply ui’s effort in getting badge bj .
Users’ unit time effort can vary with time and can be represented
as a function on time, e.g., ei,j(t). The total amount of unit time
effort in different areas of all users are assumed to be equal, i.e.,
|ei|1 = |ej |1, for ∀ui, uj ∈ U . Meanwhile, the more time people
devote to certain area, the more cumulative efforts he will devote to
the area.
Definition 3. (Cumulative Effort): Term eˆi,j =
∫ t
t
ei,j(t) dt is
defined as the cumulative effort that user ui devotes to badge bj
during time period [t, t]. For both users and designer, cumula-
tive effort is more meaningful as they only care about the total
amount of effective efforts devoted to the system. Vector eˆi =
[eˆi,1, eˆi,2, · · · , eˆi,m] is defined as the cumulative efforts that user
ui pays to the network.
In this paper, active users are assumed to have more cumula-
tive efforts as they spend more time using the social network. The
achievements people obtain depend on not only their ability in a
certain area but also the efforts the devoted to the area, which can
be formally defined as their contributions to the network.
Definition 4. (User Contribution): The effectiveness of users’
cumulative efforts devoted to a social network is formally defined
as their contributions. Vector ci = [ci,1, ci,2, · · · , ci,m] is defined
to be user ui’s contributions to the whole system, where ci,j is the
contribution of user ui devoted to the network in getting badge bj
during [t, t]:
ci,j =
∫ t
t
ai,jei,j(t) dt = ai,j
∫ t
t
ei,j(t) dt = ai,j eˆi,j .
As a result, the more effort people devote to areas they are gifted
at, the more remarkable achievements they can get in the areas. In
social networks, whether a user can receive a badge depends on
not only the contributions he/she make but also the contribution
threshold of the badge.
Definition 5. (Badge Threshold): A badge’s threshold denotes
the minimum required contributions required for users to get the
badge. For badges in B, their threshold can be represented as θ =
[θ1, θ2, · · · , θm].
For a given user ui, if his/her contribution to badge bj , i.e., ci,j ,
is greater than bj’s threshold θj , then ui will get bj , which can be
represented with the following badge indicator function:
I(ci,j ≥ θj) =
{
1, if ci,j ≥ θj ,
0, otherwise.
Furthermore, the badges that user ui have received can be repre-
sented as the badge indicator vector Ii = [I(ci,1 ≥ θ1), I(ci,2 ≥
θ2), · · · , I(ci,m ≥ θm)]. Before the system starts to operate and
players begin to invest their efforts, the badge system designer needs
to specify the badge system settings in advance, which is formally
defined as the badge system mechanism in this paper.
Definition 6. (Badge System Mechanism): Badge system mech-
anism describes various detailed aspects of the system. In addition
to badge thresholds, the mechanism of badge system in online so-
cial networks can also involve the categories, number, names, IDs,
levels of badges, as well as methods to get the badges, etc.
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Figure 5: Estimated value functions by fitting the data.
3. BADGE VALUE FUNCTIONS
The motivation of users being willing to devote efforts to get
badges in online social networks is because these badges are valu-
able to them. Depending on the specific scenarios, the value of
badges for users can be quite different. According to the observa-
tions in Section 1, the effects of badges on users’ social activities
can be models as three different kinds of values of these badges. In
this section, we will introduce three different value functions which
can capture the badge values from different perspectives: (1) per-
sonal interest value function, (2) peer leadership value function,
and (3) network trend value function.
3.1 Peer Leadership Value Function
In our daily life, on the one hand, people want to be different
from the public, but, on the other hand, they may also want to fol-
low the mainstream as well. We have similar observations about
users badge achieving activities in online social networks. Users
in online social networks want to be the first to win certain badges
in their communities, which can show their uniqueness and make
them stand out from his/her peers. Meanwhile, if most of the peers
have obtained a certain badge, users will follow their friends to get
the badge to extract themselves from the backward position. To
depict the effectiveness of badges to make users be either more su-
perior to his peers or closer to other leading peers, we formally
define the peer leadership badge value in this part.
3.1.1 Peer Leadership Value Function Definition
Definition 7. (Peer Leadership Value): The peer leadership value
of badge bj for a user ui is defined as a function about the ratio of
ui’s peers who have obtained badge bj already. Let Γ(ui) be the
neighbor set of user ui ∈ U , in which users who have achieved
badge bj before ui can be represented as Ψ(ui, bj) = {um|(um ∈
Γ(ui)) ∧ (Im(j) = 1)}. The peer leadership value function of
badge bj for user ui can be represented as function
vps(ui, bj |Γ(ui)) = f( |Ψ(ui, bj)||Γ(ui)| ),Ψ(ui, bj) ⊂ Γ(ui).
The concrete representation of the peer leadership value func-
tions can be quite diverse depending on the selected function f(·).
In this paper, we try 4 different functions, and the corresponding
peer leadership value functions are listed as follows:
• linear peer leadership value function
vpsl (ui, bj |Γ(ui)) = a
( |Ψ(ui, bj)|
|Γ(ui)|
)
+ b,
• quadratic peer leadership value function
vpsp (ui, bj |Γ(ui)) = a
( |Ψ(ui, bj)|
|Γ(ui)|
)2
+ b
( |Ψ(ui, bj)|
|Γ(ui)|
)
+ c,
• cubic peer leadership value function
vpsc (ui, bj |Γ(ui)) = a
( |Ψ(ui, bj)|
|Γ(ui)|
)3
+ b
( |Ψ(ui, bj)|
|Γ(ui)|
)2
+ c
( |Ψ(ui, bj)|
|Γ(ui)|
)
+ d,
• exponential leadership value function
vpse (ui, bj |Γ(ui)) = a× e
−b
( |Ψ(ui,bj)|
|Γ(ui)|
)
+ c,
where a, b, c and d are the coefficients in the functions which can
be learnt from the historical data.
Given the real peer leadership value function of badges in the
social network, f(x), the optimal parameters can be learnt by min-
imizing the following objective function:
ωˆ = arg min
ω
∫ 1
0
|f(x)− vps(x)| dx
where ω is the vector of coefficients (e.g., ω = [a, b] in the linear
peer leadership value function) and x = |Ψ(ui,bj)||Γ(ui)| ∈ [0, 1]. To
resolve the function, we propose to learn the coefficients by fitting
the 11 discrete points shown in Figure 1(b) and can get different
estimated peer leadership value functions in Figures 5(a)-5(d) re-
spectively.
3.1.2 Peer Leadership Value Function Evaluation
Experiment Settings
The higher peer leadership value a badge has, the more likely a
user will try to obtain it. To test the effectiveness of the above intro-
duced peer leadership value functions, we conduct an experiments
on the Foursquare badge system dataset introduced in Section ??.
In the experiment, badges achieved by less than 100 users are re-
moved and the remaining badges achieved by users are organized
in a sequence of (user, badge) pairs according to their achieving
timestamps. These (user, badge) pairs are divided into two subse-
quences according to their relative timestamps order: the training
set and testing set, the proportion of whose sizes is 9 : 1. In addi-
tion, a set of non-existing (user, badge) pairs which is of the same
size as the positive test set are randomly sampled from the network
as the negative test set, which together with the positive test set
are used to form the final testing set. Pairs in the training set are
regarded as the historical data, based on which we calculate the
values of pairs in the testing set and output them as the confidence
scores of these pairs.
The evaluation metrics applied in the experiment is AUC. In
statistics, a receiver operating characteristic (ROC), or ROC curve,
is a graphical plot that illustrates the performance of a binary clas-
sifier system as its discrimination threshold is varied. The curve
is created by plotting the true positive rate (TPR) against the false
positive rate (FPR) at various threshold settings. The area under
the ROC curve is usually quantified as the AUC score. When using
normalized units, the area under the curve (i.e.„ AUC) is equal to
the probability that a classifier will rank a randomly chosen posi-
tive instance higher than a randomly chosen negative one (assum-
ing “positive” ranks higher than “negative”). Generally speaking,
larger AUC score corresponds to better performance of the predic-
tion model.
Experiment Results
We learn the coefficients of different value functions with the
training set and apply the learnt function to calculate the peer lead-
ership values of pairs in the testing set. The results are available in
Figure 6. From the results, we observe that AUC achieved by the
quadratic peer leadership function is 0.65, which is slightly bet-
ter than other value functions, and the AUC scores obtained by the
linear, cubic and exponential peer leadership functions are 0.58,
0.63, and 0.62 respectively. Here, quadratic function can outper-
form cubic and exponential functions can because of the reason
that cubic function may suffer from the overfitting problems a lot.
Next, we will use the quadratic peer leadership function as the only
peer leadership function, which will be compared with other value
functions in Figure 7.
3.2 Network Trend Value Function
Besides the effects of personal interests and peer pressure, there
exists some global trend about the network steering users badge
achievement activities in the whole network. In online social net-
work, users achieve badges in a sequential time order. For exam-
ple, badges achieved by user ui can be organized into a sequential
transaction 〈bi1, bi2, · · · , bil〉 according to the achieving timestamps,
where ui got badge bip before biq if p < q. For all users in U , we can
represent the badge achievement sequential transactions as {u1 :
〈b11, b12, ..., b1l 〉, u2 : 〈b21, b22, ..., b2o〉, · · · , un : 〈bn1 , bn2 , ..., bnq 〉}
The network influence can be captured by extracting the fre-
quent badge achieving sequential patterns from the transactions and
many different pattern extraction methods have been proposed so
far. In this paper, PrefixSpan proposed by Pei et al. [15] is applied.
Consider, for example, we extract two frequent sequence patterns:
pattern 1: 〈bl, bo, · · · , bp〉 and pattern 2: 〈bl, bo, · · · , bp, bq〉 with
supports support(pattern 1) and support(pattern 2) respectively
from the network. Rule r can be generated based on pattern 1 and
pattern 2 representing that for users who have obtained badges in
〈bl, bo, · · · , bp〉 has a chance of conf to get badge bq:
r : 〈bl, bo, · · · , bp〉 → 〈bq〉, conf = support(pattern 2)
support(pattern 1)
,
where 〈bl, bo, · · · , bp〉 is called the antecedent of rule r (i.e., ant.(r))
and 〈bq〉 is named as the consequent of r (i.e., con.(r)). Score
conf(r) =
support(pattern 2)
support(pattern 1) is called the confidence of rule r.
Various rules together with their confidence scores can be gener-
ated based on the frequent sequence pattern mining results, which
can be represented as setR, based on which we can define the net-
work trend value function as follow.
Definition 8. (Network Trend Value Function): For a given user
ui, who has achieved a sequence of badgesH = 〈bi1 , bi2 , · · · , bi|H|〉
already, the network trend value function of badge bj for ui is de-
fined as the maximal confidence score of rules that can be applied
to badges inH and badge bj , i.e.,
vnt(ui, bj |H) = max{conf(r)|r ∈ R, ant.(r) ⊂ H, con.(r) = bj}.
We evaluate the effectiveness of the introduced network trend
value of badges based on the same experiment setting introduced
in Section 3.1.2. As shown in Figure 7, network trend value based
badge predictor along can achieve an AUC score of 0.68 in infer-
ring potential badge achievement activities.
3.3 Personal Interest Value Function
Users can have their personal interests, which can steer their so-
cial activities in online social networks. For example, sport enthusi-
asts may visit gyms and outdoor places frequently, while gourmets
tend to go to good restaurants on the other hand. Users’ personal
interests can be revealed from the badges obtained in the past. For
example, for a given user ui who has already achieved the “Gym
Rat” badges of levels from 1 to 4, it can show that ui can like doing
sports a lot and “Gym Rat” of level 5 can meet his interest and can
be of great value to him. Viewed in this way, the value of badges
can be evaluated with the badges that users obtained in the past.
Definition 9. (Personal Interest Value): For a given user ui and
the set of badges obtained by ui in the past, i.e., H, the personal
interest value of badge bj for user ui is defined to be
vpi(ui, bj |H) =
∑
bk∈H s(bj , bk)v
pi(ui, bk)
|H| ,
where s(bj , bk) denotes the similarity score between badge bj and
bk and vpi(ui, bk) represents the personal interest value of badge
bk for user ui.
For badge bk ∈ H that ui has obtained in the past, we define the
personal interest value of ui to badge bj as 1.0 (i.e., vpi(ui, bk) =
1.0, for ∀bk ∈ H). The similarity score between any two badges,
e.g., bj and bk, is defined as the Jaccard’s Coefficient score [14]
of user sets who have achieved bj and bk (i.e., Γ(bj) and Γ(bk))
respectively in the network:
s(bj , bk) =
|Γ(bj) ∩ Γ(bk)|
|Γ(bj) ∪ Γ(bk)| .
Based on the above descriptions, the personal interest value of
badge bj for user ui can be represented as
vpi(ui, bj |H) =
∑
bk∈H
|Γ(bj)∩Γ(bk)|
|Γ(bj)∪Γ(bk)|
|H| .
The effectiveness of the personal interest value of badge is eval-
uated with a similar experiment setting, whose result is available
in Figure 7. We can observe that ranking badges according to their
personal interest values for each user can achieve an AUC score of
0.66.
3.4 Comprehensive Value Function Definition
and Evaluation
To capture the information from all the three aspects in calculat-
ing badge values, we define the comprehensive value value function
as a combination of the personal interest value, peer leadership
value and network trend value functions:
v
c
(ui, bj) = α · vpi(ui, bj) + β · vpp(ui, bj) + (1− α− β)vns(ui, bj),
where parameters α, β are assigned with value 1
3
for simplicity in
this paper.
To show the effectiveness of the above defined badge value func-
tions in modeling users’ badge obtaining activities, we also com-
pare their performance in inferring users’ badge achieving proba-
bilities in the Foursquare badge system dataset. For the peer leader-
ship value function, the quadratic function is used as it can achieve
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Figure 6: Comparison of peer leadership value functions
the best performance in Figure 6. Experiment setting here is iden-
tical to that introduced in Section 3.1.2 and the results is available
in Figure 7. From the result we observe that network trend value
function performs better than personal interest and peer leadership
value functions, which can achieve AUC scores about 0.68, 0.66,
and 0.65 respectively. Meanwhile, the comprehensive value func-
tion that merge the isolated value functions together can improve
the performance greatly and can obtain AUC score is 0.77, which
is 13.2%, 16.7%, and 18.5% higher than the AUC scores achieved
by personal interest, peer leadership and network trend value func-
tions.
4. USER UTILITY FUNCTION
Value of badges is the reward that users can receive from the sys-
tem. Meanwhile, to get the reward, they also need to afford certain
costs introduced when finishing the required tasks. Generally, if the
reward is greater than the cost, the badge will deserve the efforts.
For example, if user ui can get badge bj eventually, then ui can
get a reward, i.e., the value of bj to ui (e.g., vc(ui, bj)) and also
needs to pay some costs, i.e., his cumulative efforts eˆi,j devoted to
bj . The payoff user ui can receive by devoting efforts to badge bj
is defined to be the utility of bj for ui. The formal definitions of the
reward, cost and utility functions of badges for users are available
as follows:
4.1 User Utility Function Definition
Definition 10. (Reward Function): The reward function of user
ui in achieving badge bj is defined as
reward(ui, bj) = I(ci,j ≥ θj)vc(ui, bj).
If ui can obtain bj , then the reward ui can achieve will be the
comprehensive value of badge bj for ui; otherwise, the reward will
be 0.
Definition 11. (Cost Function): To achieve a certain badge, e.g.,
bj , the cost that ui needs to pay is defined as the cumulative effort
that ui invests on bj :
cost(ui, bj) = eˆi,j .
The minimum efforts e˜i,j required for user ui to get badge bj
is determined by ui’s ability in achieving bj as well as the badge
threshold of bj , which can be represented as
e˜i,j = arg min
eˆ
(ai,j eˆi,j ≥ θj) = θj
ai,j
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other isolated value functions
Definition 12. (Utility Function): The utility function of ui in
achieving bj is defined as
utility(ui, bj) = reward(ui, bj)− cost(ui, bj)
= I(ci,j ≥ θj)vc(ui, bj)− eˆi,j .
If ui can get bj , i.e., ai,j eˆi,j ≥ θj , then utility(ui, bj) = vc(ui, bj)−
eˆi,j ; otherwise, utility(ui, bj) = −eˆi,j .
The overall utility function of users ui over all badges in B is
represented as
utility(ui) =
∑
bj∈B
utility(ui, bj)
= I>i v
c
i − ‖eˆi‖1 ,
where I>i denotes the transpose of the badge indicator vector of
ui, vci = (v
c
i,1, v
c
i,2, · · · , vci,m) is the comprehensive value vector
of all badges for ui, eˆi is the cumulative effort vector of ui and
‖eˆi‖1 =
∑m
j=1 eˆi,j is the L1 norm of vector eˆi.
4.2 User Utility Function Evaluation
To demonstrate the effectiveness of the utility in modeling users’
badge achieving activities, we conduct the experiments to show the
performance of user utility function in inferring users badge achiev-
ing activities. Experiment settings here is identical to those intro-
duced before but, to calculate the utilities of different badges for
users, we need to know users’ total cumulative efforts, ability dis-
tributions, and badge thresholds in advance.
Inference of Cumulative Effort: Active users in online social net-
works are assumed to have more cumulative efforts. In our dataset,
the activeness measure can be defined as the number of badges
users achieved. And the cumulative effort of user, e.g., ui, can be
obtained by normalizing the badge numbers to the range of [0, 1]
with equation #(ui)−#min
#max−#min , where #(ui) is the number of badges
achieved by ui and #max and #min are the maximal and mini-
mal number of badges achieved by users in U respectively.
Inference of User Ability Vector: In the training set, user ui’s in-
ferred ability vector is defined to be ainferi = (ai,1, ai,2, · · · , ai,m)
of length m = |B|, where ai,j is the number of times that ui ob-
tained badge of category bj in the training set. Each user is assumed
to have the same amount of ability but can be distributed differ-
ently. Vector ainferi is normalized by the total number of achieved
badges to ensure
∣∣∣ainferi ∣∣∣
1
= 1. Considering that users can have
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their hidden abilities, a random ability vector arandomi of length
m is generated whose cells contain random numbers in [0, 1] and
α · ainferi + (1.0− α) · arandomi is used as the final ability vector
of user ui. In this paper, we set parameter α = 0.85.
Inference of Badge Threshold: Badges which are hard to achieve
will be obtained later. For each badge bj ∈ B, we get all the users
who have achieved bj from the training set: {uj1, uj2, · · · , ujk}. For
user uji ∈ {uj1, uj2, · · · , ujk}, we organize all the badges obtained
by uji from the training set in a sequence according to their achiev-
ing timestamps, the index of bj in uji ’s achieved badge list is ex-
tracted to calculate bj’s threshold. For example, if ui have achieved
p badges in all and the index of bj in the list is q, then the thresh-
old of bj for ui is estimated as θj,i = pq . The threshold of badge
bj is defined as the average of thresholds calculated for all these
users: θj = ηj
∑k
o=1 θj,o
k
where ηj is a scaling parameter. Value
ηj is selected as large as possible but, at the same time, ηj needs to
ensure that for all users who have obtained badge bj in the training
set (i.e., ∀uji ∈ {uj1, uj2, · · · , ujk}). When uji devotes all his cumu-
lative effort to get bj , uji ’s contribution can obtain bj in our model
and, in other words, his contribution can exceed θj .
Based on the above inferred cumulative efforts, ability of users as
well as badge thresholds, we show the results achieved by the user
utility function in Figure 8 and also compare it with the compre-
hensive value function introduced before. From the results, we can
observe that the introduced user utility function can perform very
well in modeling users badge achieving activities. The AUC score
achieved by the user utility function is 0.83, which is 7.8% larger
than the AUC score achieved by comprehensive value function (i.e.,
0.77). As a result, user utility function can provide a more compre-
hensive modeling about users’ badge achievement activities.
5. GAME AMONG USERS
In social networks, every user wants to maximize his/her util-
ity in achieving badges and the value of different badges for cer-
tain user may depend on other users social activities. As a result,
the badge achieving activities in online social networks can form
a game among users. In traditional game theory, all the agents
(e.g., users in social networks) are all assumed to be self-interested,
which means that they have their own description about the states
of world they like the most and they will act in an attempt to bring
about these states of the world. “Self-interested” doesn’t neces-
sarily mean that users tend to harm other users to maximize their
payoff, as it can also include good things happening to other users
as well. Meanwhile, what users can do in the game is to deter-
mine the distribution of their cumulative efforts, which is formally
defined as the strategy as follows.
Definition 13. (Strategy): A user’s strategy refers to the options
that he chooses in a setting where the outcome depends not only
on his own actions but also on the actions of other users. A user’s
strategy can determine the actions the user will take at any stage of
the game.
In badge systems, users strategy can cover various aspects of
their social activities but, in this paper, we refer to the strategy of
users as the way how they distribute their cumulative efforts for
simplicity. In game theory, strategy can be divided into two cat-
egories: (1) pure strategy, and (2) mixed strategy. The strategy
which is to select one single action in the game is referred to as the
pure strategy. In the given badge set B, a user ui can choose to
get one badge only, e.g., bj ∈ B, and devote all his/her efforts to
obtaining that badge, the strategy of which is a pure strategy.
Meanwhile, let Π(X ) be the set of all possible distributions over
set X . Then the set of mixed strategies for user ui is si = Π(Ai),
where Ai is the set of all possible actions that ui can take. The set
of all possible mixed strategy that ui can apply is represented as set
Si. For simplicity, we can just regard the cumulative effort distri-
bution vector eˆi = [eˆi,1, eˆi,2, · · · , eˆi,m] as the action distribution
Π(Ai), i.e., user ui’s strategy si = eˆi.
Given the user set U , we can represent the strategies of all users
in U except ui as s−i = (s1, s2, · · · , si−1, si+1, · · · , sn). Thus
we can write the strategies of all users in U as s = (si, s−i), where
sk = eˆk, k ∈ {1, 2, · · · , n}. Meanwhile, depending on users’
various mixed strategies, different kinds of social activities will be
exerted in achieving badges, which can lead to different utilities.
Definition 14. (Strategy Utility Function): Given user ui’s and
other users’ strategies: si and s−i, the utility that ui can get based
on si and s−i can be represented as:
u(si, s−i) = utility(ui|si, s−i)
=
m∑
j=1
utility(ui, bj |si, s−i).
Definition 15. (Strategy Domination): Let si and s′i be two mixed
strategies of user ui and s−i be the strategies of all other users in
U except ui. Then,
• Strict Domination: for ui, si strictly dominates s′i iff u(si, s−i) >
u(s′i, s−i) for ∀s−i ∈ S−i, where S−i represents the set of
all potential strategies of other users except ui;
• Weak Domination: for ui, si weakly dominates s′i iff u(si, s−i) ≥
u(s′i, s−i) ∀s−i ∈ S−i and ∃s−i ∈ S−i, such that u(si, s−i) >
u(s′i, s−i);
• Very Weak Domination: for ui, si very weakly dominates s′i
iff u(si, s−i) ≥ u(s′i, s−i) for ∀s−i ∈ S−i.
Definition 16. (Dominant Strategy): Let si be a mixed strat-
egy of user ui, si is a (strictly, weakly, very weakly) dominant
strategy iff si can (strictly, weakly, very weakly) dominate s′i for
s′i ∈ Si, s′i 6= si, regardless of other users’ strategies (i.e., s−i).
The optimal distribution of ui’s cumulative efforts is identical to
the dominant strategy of ui, which can be obtained by solving the
following maximization objective function:
sˆi = arg max
si
u(si, s−i),
Table 3: Contributions of top 10 badges
badge name total # total contributions
Fresh Brew 7878 27.6
Mall Rat 7028 26.2
JetSetter 6468 24.5
Hot Tamale 6355 23.2
Great Outdoors 5728 21.8
Pizzaiolo 4746 17.8
Swimmies 4361 16.4
Bento 3774 13.7
Zoetrope 3580 12.9
Flame Broiled 3494 12.6
where sˆi is the dominant strategy of ui and other users strategies
s−i ∈ S−i can take any potential value.
The above objective function is very hard to solve mathemati-
cally, as we may need to enumerate all potential strategies of all the
users (including both ui and other users) in the network to obtain
the global optimal strategy of ui. Based on the assumption that all
users are “self-interested”, in this paper, we propose to calculate
the equilibrium state of all users strategy selection process instead
as follows:
We let the users to decide their optimal strategies in a random
order iteratively until convergence. At first, in the 1st round, we let
users to decide their optimal strategies in a random order. For ex-
ample, if we let ui be the first one to choose his “optimal strategy”
when other users are not involved in the system (i.e., s−i = 0), we
can represent strategy selected by ui’s as:
s˜i = arg max
si
u(si,0).
Based on ui’s “optimal strategy”, other users in U −{ui} (e.g., uj)
will take turns to decide their own “optimal” strategies by utilizing
the selected strategies of other users. For example, let uj be the 2nd
user to decide his/her strategy right after ui. The “optimal strategy”
of uj can be represented as
s˜j = arg max
sj
u(sj , {s˜i} ∪ 0).
And let uk be the last user to select the “optimal strategy” in the
1st round. Based on the known strategies selected by all the other
users, the “optimal strategy” of uk can be represented as
s˜k = arg max
sk
u(sk, {s˜1, s˜2, · · · , s˜k−1, s˜k+1, · · · , s˜|U|}).
After finishing the 1st round, we will start the 2nd round and all
users will decide their strategies in a random order. Such a process
will continue until all users’ “optimal strategies” selected in round
k is identical to those in round k − 1 (i.e., the stationary state),
which will be outputted as the final optimal strategies of all users.
6. BADGE SYSTEM DESIGN
In addition to the game among users, there also exists a game
between users and badge system designer. Users in online social
networks want to maximize their utilities with as few efforts as pos-
sible. Meanwhile, badge system designer who decides the badge
system mechanism aims at maximizing all users contributions to
the network on the other hand. In this section, we will study how to
determine the optimal badge system mechanism, and provide de-
tailed simulation analysis about the designed badge system based
on the model of user badge achievement activities learnt from the
previous sections.
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Figure 9: Simulation analysis of contributions achieved by
badge mechanisms containing different numbers of badges
For simplicity, we define the amount of contribution attracted by
a badge as the contribution of the badge as follows:
Definition 17. (Badge Contribution): For a given badge mecha-
nismM, where the placed badge set is B, the contribution of badge
bj ∈ B is defined as the total amount of contributions that users de-
voted to getting bj . Based on the optimal strategy sˆi of user ui
obtained from the game objective function proposed in the previ-
ous section, badge bj’s contribution can be represented as
c(bj |M) =
∑
ui∈U
ai,j sˆi,j ,
where sˆi,j is the optimal strategy ui selected to get badge bj .
Furthermore, for a given badge mechanismM, where the badge
set is B, the contribution of badge set B′ ⊂ B selected in badge
mechanismM can be represented as
c(B′|M) =
∑
bj∈B′
∑
ui∈U
ai,j sˆi,j .
Different badge system mechanisms can lead to different amounts
of contributions from users and the optimal one that can attract the
maximum contribution is defined as the dominant badge mecha-
nism.
Definition 18. (Dominant Badge Mechanism): Given a badge
mechanismM, in which the placed badge set is B, ifM can lead
to more user contributions to the system than all the other badge
mechanisms, thenM is defined as the dominant badge mechanism:
Mˆ = arg max
M
c(M) = arg max
M
c(B|M).
Badge Mechanism can cover lots of different aspects, e.g., badge
categories, the total number of badges, tasks required to get these
badges, etc. In the following parts, we will analyze these aspects
one by one.
Definition 19. (Dominant Badge Category) For the given badge
mechanismM (in which the badge set is B), the dominant badge
category is defined as the badge category that can lead to the max-
imal contribution to the social network,
bˆj = arg max
bj∈B
c(bj |M).
According to the experiment settings introduced in Section 4,
users decide their optimal strategies with methods proposed in the
previous section. Based on users’ optimal strategies, the top 10
most badge categories that can lead to the maximum contribution
are available in Table 3. In the table, we show the badge names,
number of times that users have obtain certain kind of badges and
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Figure 10: Simulation analysis of contributions achieved by
badge mechanisms of different badge thresholds
the contributions of each badge. Generally, popular badges (i.e.,
badges achieved by many users) can attract more contributions from
users according to the results.
Definition 20. (Dominant Badge Category Set) For the given
badge mechanism M and badge set B, the dominant badge cat-
egory set of size K is defined as the badge subset B’, |B′| = K,
which can lead to the maximal contribution to the social network,
Bˆ′ = arg max
B′⊂B,|B′|=K
c(B′|M).
To analyze the effects of badge numbers on the global contribu-
tions of badge system, we select the topK,K ∈ {1, 2, · · · , 5, 10, 20,
· · · , 50, 100, 200, · · · , 500} categories of badges from the network
and calculate the contribution of these badges. The simulation re-
sults are given in Figure 9, where the total contribution of all these
top K badges will increase as K increases, but the speed of the
growth will slow down when K is large enough (e.g., K ≥ 100).
It supports that small number of badges are already enough to ap-
proximate the optimal revenue as introduced in [11].
Another key factor in badge system design is the badge thresh-
olds and the optimal badge thresholds is formally defined as the
dominant badge threshold as follows.
Definition 21. (Dominant Badge Threshold) For the given badge
mechanismM and badge set B, the dominant badge threshold θˆ is
defined as
θˆ = arg max
θ
c(B|M, θ).
We also study the effects of badge thresholds on the overall con-
tributions of these badges to the network and the simulation analy-
sis results are given in Figure 10. To simplify the experiment set-
ting, we set the thresholds of all badges with the same value in
{0.0, 0.1, · · · , 0.9, 1.0} and get the contributions obtained by the
badges. As shown in Figure 10, the contribution of all these badges
is 0 when the threshold is 0 and 1.0, where threshold 0 denotes
that users can get badges without paying any efforts; threshold 1.0
means that users need to devote all their efforts on getting the badge
corresponding to the area that all their ability lies in (i.e., ability in
this area is 1.0). Contributions made to the network will increases
fast as badge threshold increase at the beginning and can achieve
the maximal contribution when threshold is 0.3 and 0.4 and then it
will decreases.
7. RELATED WORK
Reward systems, e.g., badge system, have been widely employed
in online social networks, like Foursquare [3, 1, 4]. Antin et. al.
study the badges in online social networks from a social psycho-
logical perspective and give some basic introduction of badges in
Foursquare [3]. Large amount of badges are placed in Foursquare
and a complete list of Foursquare badges is available [1]. To ob-
tain badges in Foursquare, users need to reveal their locations by
checking in at certain locations. Carbunar et. al. study the problem
between privacy preservation and badge achievement in Foursquare
[4].
Users are all assumed to be “selfish” and want to maximize their
payoff, which will form a game among users in online social net-
works to compete with each other. There has been a growing litera-
ture on analyzing the game among users in online social networks.
Ghosh et. al. [10, 7, 9] provide a game-theoretic model within
which to study the problem of incentivizing high quality user gen-
erated content, in which contributors are strategic and motivated by
exposure. Jain et. al. [13] present a simple game-theoretic model
of the ESP game and characterize the equilibrium behavior in their
model. Their equilibrium analysis supports the fact that users ap-
pear to be coordinating on low effort words.
To achieve the maximal contribution to the sites, many works
have been done on designing the badge system for online social
networks. Jain et. al. [12] study the problem of incentive design
for online question and answer sites. Anderson et. al. [2] study how
badges can influence and steer users behavior on social networks,
which can lead both to increased participation and to changes in
the mix of activities a user pursues in the network. Ghosh et. al.
[8] study the problem of implementing a mechanism which can
lead to optimal outcomes in social computing based on a game-
theoretic approach. Immorlica et. al. [11] study the badge system
design whose goal is to maximize contributions. Easley et. al.
[6] take a game-theoretic approach to badge design, analyzing the
incentives created by badges and potential contributors as well as
their contribution to the sites.
The badge system analysis and design problem studied in this
paper is a novel problem and different from existing works on re-
ward system analysis: (1) “steering user behavior with badges” [2],
which studies the incentives of badges in guiding users online ac-
tivities without considering the effects of social connections among
users; (2) “social status and the design of optimal badges” [11],
which provides theoretical derivations of the optimal badge system
design problem but fails to consider the game among users and the
game between users and badge system designer; and (3) “imple-
menting optimal outcomes in social computing: a game-theoretic
approach” [8], which tries to use a game theory based method to
analyze the motivations of users in getting badges but doesn’t con-
sider the “badge system design” problem.
8. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we study the badge system analysis and design
problem, which covers (1) badge system analysis and (2) badge
system design problem. We introduce the three different categories
of badges value functions for users in online social networks. To
depict users’ payoff by achieving badges in online social networks,
we formally define the utility function for users. We solve the
“badge system analysis” problem as a game among users in so-
cial network and address the “badge system design” problem as a
game between badge system designer and the users. Experiments
conducted on real-world badge system dataset demonstrate that our
model can capture users’ motivations in achieving badges online
very well and design badge system mechanism that can lead to
maximal contributions.
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